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ABSTRACT 
This article draws on the multi-level perspective 
(MLP) and global value chain (GVC) frameworks 
to analyse the drivers and trajectories of foreign 
private investment in biofuel production in 
Ghana. The analyses are based on a narrative of 
the evolution of a niche for jatropha production 
in Ghana spanning the period 1995–2004 and 
including detailed company case studies. 
Relating to the MLP framework  the factors 
analysed influencing internal niche processes are 
alignment of expectations, network formation, 
and learning and knowledge sharing, while those 
relating to the GVC framework are value chain 
attributes, including chain structure, governance, 
ownership, and access to land and capital. 
The study identifies significant entry barriers 
to establishing new agriculture-based value 
chains for global biofuel markets, especially high 
volume requirements, high capital needs and 
international market risks, which contributed to 
the collapse of the jatropha sector in Ghana and 
thus to the failure to capitalise on the initially 
high expectations of biofuel production. We also 
found a low level of learning and knowledge-
sharing between jatropha niche actors in Ghana, 
which, alongside weak public R&D support, 
reduced access to locally specific technical and 
managerial information. The report presents an 
example of non-evolutionary niche development, 
which goes beyond the European experience of 
industrial niche development on which the MLP 
framework was first established. The importance 
of investors and policy at different levels of the 
value chain illustrates the synergies that may 
be obtained from combining the MLP and GVC 
frameworks in research on energy transitions in 
developing countries.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Since the turn of the millennium, Jatropha 
Curcas has emerged as a promising opportunity 
for sustainable biofuel production due to a 
number of positive properties that are attributed 
to it, such as high yield, low water and fertilizer 
requirements, high resistance to pests, and not 
least its ability to grow on marginal land without 
competing with food production (Jongschaap 
et al., 2007)(Achten et al., 2008). Between 2005 
and 2009 especially, there was strong global 
enthusiasm for jatropha (Sanderson, 2009), 
which many investors, government actors and 
NGOs perceived as a miracle or wonder crop (von 
Maltitz et al., 2014). Globally, however, jatropha 
did not live up to these inflated expectations. 
By 2014 global jatropha production was still 
negligible (van Eijck et al., 2014a), and, based on 
the experience of jatropha cultivation in Tanzania 
(Segerstedt and Bobert, 2013), it was concluded 
that ‘both domestic production and (certified) 
exports are too expensive to be able to compete 
with conventional diesel/rapeseed oil from the 
EU’. Nonetheless, it was argued that ‘the crop 
may have potential for large-scale production as 
a niche product’ (ibid.). 
Jatropha was also grown on a large scale in Mali 
(Favretto et al., 2015), Kenya (Hunsberger, 2013) 
and Mozambique (Slingerland and Schut, 2014; 
von Maltitz et al., 2014), but Ghana and Tanzania 
were the two African countries that attracted the 
greatest number of private companies prepared 
to make substantial investments in large-scale 
jatropha farming (Romijn and Caniëls, 2011; 
van Eijck et al., 2014b; Van Eijck et al., 2014). In 
Ghana research into jatropha has mainly focused 
on land issues (Boamah, 2014a, 2014b; Campion 
and Acheampong, 2014; Kidido and Kuusaana, 
2014; Schoneveld and German, 2013; Wisborg, 
2013) and questions of the environment and 
livelihoods (Acheampong and Campion, 2014, 
2013; Boamah and Overå, 2016; Schoneveld et 
al., 2011), but we find no attempts to understand 
jatropha investments in Ghana from the 
perspectives of a transition to sustainability or of 
agricultural or industrial development. 
Research into sustainable transitions emerged 
in European countries with a focus on the 
Netherlands, the UK and Denmark, being pursued 
mainly from three different perspectives: the 
multi-level perspective (MLP) (Geels, 2002), the 
strategic niche management (SNM) perspective 
(Kemp et al., 1998) and a technological 
innovation system (TIS) perspective (Bergek et 
al., 2008; Hekkert et al., 2007). Lately, research 
on sustainability transitions in developing 
countries has attracted much interest, with 
seminal contributions by (Angel and Rock, 2009; 
Berkhout et al., 2010, 2009; Romijn and Caniëls, 
2011; van Eijck and Romijn, 2008). While the 
geographical range has mainly been on emerging 
economies in Asia (see for example (Hansen and 
Nygaard, 2014)), research into sustainability 
transitions has also been undertaken in Africa, 
especially in Tanzania and Kenya (Byrne, 2009; 
Ockwell and Byrne, 2015; Tigabu et al., 2013). 
However, as Lundvall et al. have already pointed 
out (2009), there are profound differences 
between how transitions unfold in low-income 
developing countries and in high-income, 
western industrialized economies respectively. 
Compared to developed countries, developing 
countries often have weaker formal institutions, 
higher levels of political and bureaucratic 
inefficiency and corruption, greater political 
and economic instability, and less transparent 
and efficient legal frameworks. When it comes 
to using the theoretical frameworks of transition 
theory in the context of a developing country, the 
most important challenge may be the fact that 
technology, knowledge and finance in general 
are to a larger extent sourced through links with 
international research organizations, foreign 
companies, investors and international donors 
(Hansen and Nygaard, 2013), as (Pietrobelli and 
Rabellotti, 2009) have also highlighted.
The role of international ties can be addressed by 
means of the global value chain (GVC) approach, 
which has played a prominent role in analyses 
of agricultural and industrial development 
in developing countries since the early 1990s 
(Gereffi, 1999). Much of the GVC literature focuses 
on how firms and farms in developing countries 
are integrated into global markets (Bolwig 
et al., 2010). Some of this literature concerns 
agricultural exports from Africa, mainly with a 
focus on food (Bolwig et al., 2013; Gibbon and 
Ponte, 2005), but also fibre (Glin et al., 2012; 
Rieple and Singh, 2010), while only a few GVC 
studies from developing regions concern agro-
fuel (biofuel) exports (Hunsberger et al., 2014; 
Ponte and Hunsberger, 2014). GVC studies of 
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global biofuels markets (Ponte, 2014) and biofuel 
imports (Harnesk et al., 2015) have recently been 
published, pointing to the strong influence of 
policies and NGO advocacy in the governance of 
biofuel value chains.
Based on the empirical knowledge gap outlined 
above, this report sets out to analyse the drivers 
behind the large-scale foreign investments in a 
biofuel value chain in Ghana and to identify the 
main reasons for their rise and fall. To address 
this question, we shall draw on transition theory, 
especially the MLP framework, to acquire insights 
into the historical evolution of the niche and 
regime conditions and the interactions between 
them, as well as insights from the GVC framework 
to understand the international links involved. 
We shall draw on the theory of hype cycles as a 
structuring tool in the report (Van Lente et al., 
2013; Verbong et al., 2008).
The remainder of this report is organized as 
follows. Section two presents an integrated 
analytical framework based on the MLP and GVC 
perspectives. Section three outlines the data 
collection and research methods that underpin 
the study. Section four presents the historical 
evolution of the jatropha niche, followed by 
section five, which discusses the main reasons 
for the rise and fall of foreign investments in 
biofuel production in Ghana. Some conclusions 
are presented in section six. 
2.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 MULTI-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE OR MLP
The multi-level perspective (MLP) on systems 
innovations considers how niche proliferation is 
influenced by interacting processes at different 
socio-technical levels, namely the landscape 
(macro), regime (meso) and niche (micro) levels 
(Geels, 2002; Kemp et al., 1998). The landscape 
level covers the large-scale and exogenous 
structural context that influences dynamics at 
the regime and niche levels. The regime level 
refers to the relatively stable configurations 
of institutions, techniques and artefacts, and 
of the rules, practices and actor networks, 
that determine the ‘normal’ development and 
use of technologies. Because of stabilizing 
mechanisms, regimes are characterized by 
path-dependency, structural lock-in and actors’ 
resistance to change, which hinder or constrain 
the emergence of alternative technological 
trajectories (Rohracher, 2008; Unruh, 2000). A 
niche is a local platform or ‘incubation room’ 
from which new socio-technical trajectories may 
emerge and eventually fulfil functions within 
existing regimes. Because of the stabilizing 
mechanisms just mentioned, niche proliferation 
is contingent upon destabilizing tensions that 
open up ‘windows of opportunity’ at the regime 
level (Hans de Haan and Rotmans, 2011; Verbong 
et al., 2008). Such tensions may arise from 
processes at the landscape level or from regime-
level dynamics.
In the MLP, niches are distinct application 
domains that provide a time-restricted and 
protected space within which new practices 
and technological innovations can incubate and 
become viable through experimentation. The 
viability of niches is influenced by three internal 
niche-level processes (Schot and Geels, 2008): 
(i) the shaping and alignment of expectations, 
(ii) the formation of a social actor network and 
(iii) learning processes. Increasing alignment 
of expectations involves niche-level actors 
increasingly sharing similar visions, beliefs and 
interests. A high level of aligned expectations 
is generally conducive to niche development, 
although the envisaged opportunities must be 
made specific, and they will rely on positive, 
tangible results (Geels and Raven, 2006). 
The second niche-level process concerns the 
formation of a constituency behind a new socio-
technical trajectory that consists of a network 
of engaged actors. The formation of close social 
ties and regular interactions among actors is 
seen as stimulating niche development, as does 
the involvement of a broader and more varied 
actor network (Coenen et al., 2010; van der Laak 
et al., 2007). Lastly, learning processes involve 
learning about the technological aspects of 
niche-level experiments, including technical 
design, functionality and performance, as well 
as the learning processes pertaining to the 
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social embeddedness of these aspects (Hansen 
and Nygaard, 2014). The latter requires that 
actors and society at large learn about many 
aspects of the technology, including economy, 
user preferences, regulation and environmental 
impacts. 
In empirical MLP research, the three levels 
of regime, landscape and niche are often 
operationalized using territorial boundaries: 
regimes tend to be depicted as national 
processes, landscape dynamics as international 
ones, and niche processes as sub-national or 
local. Hence transnational linkages and the 
global dimensions of transitions have to a large 
extent been analysed as part of an all-embracing 
‘landscape’ (Geels, 2011). Such territorial and 
arguably simplistic approaches have met with 
criticism from within the MLP community 
(Raven et al., 2012). Social networks in niches, 
for example, are not necessarily only local, 
as sustainability experiments and niche-level 
actors are often embedded in global flows of 
knowledge, technology and finance (Coenen and 
Truffer, 2012; Rock et al., 2009). Likewise, regimes 
may be transnational in their physical extent 
and influenced by global actor networks and 
institutional linkages that may either support 
or destabilize them (Smith et al., 2010). Thus, 
both regimes and niches may exhibit a similar 
form of multi-scalar layering in their spatial 
reach (Wieczorek et al., 2015). However, the 
understanding of niche formation and transition 
dynamics as shaped by interactions between 
actors and institutions situated across different 
spatial scales has only recently been introduced 
in the MLP (Binz et al., 2012). 
In this report, we draw attention to the flows of 
knowledge and resources facilitated through 
international biofuel investments and the 
resulting global value chains as one element in a 
transnational analysis of niche development. We 
use insights from the GVC literature that provide 
an actor-focused and ‘relational’ perspective on 
the organization and dynamics of industries.
2.2 GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS
Global value chain (GVC) analysis has emerged 
since the early 1990s as a methodological tool 
for understanding the dynamics of economic 
globalization and international trade (Gereffi and 
Lee, 2016; Gibbon et al., 2008; Gibbon and Ponte, 
2005). It is based on the analysis of discrete 
‘value chains’ where input supply, production, 
trade, and consumption or disposal are explicitly 
and, at least to some extent, coherently linked. 
The use of the ‘chain’ metaphor signals a focus 
on relationships or links between buyers and 
suppliers (chain actors) and the movement 
of products from producer to consumer. This 
entails an analysis centred on flows of material 
resources, finance, knowledge and information 
between chain actors, where ‘upstream’ signals 
flow towards production, ‘downstream’ signals 
towards consumption. The GVC approach 
involves analysing the structure, actors and 
dynamics of value chains, including the types and 
locations of chain actors, their mutual ties, and 
the dynamics of their inclusion and exclusion. 
It also entails understanding the structure of 
rewards, the division of labour along a chain, 
and the distribution of added value (Bolwig et al., 
2010).
Upgrading and governance are central GVC 
concepts. GVC research highlights how firms 
upgrade – that is, acquire capabilities and access 
new market segments – through participation 
in particular value chains, including by learning 
from buyers in these chains (Bolwig et al., 2010; 
Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi and Lee, 2016). Governance 
in the GVC literature is seen as the process by 
which so-called ‘lead firms’ (in the context 
of a larger institutional framework) organize 
activities with the purpose of achieving a certain 
functional division of labour along a value chain, 
resulting in specific allocations of resources and 
distributions of gains. It involves setting the 
terms of chain membership, such as compliance 
with standards (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005), the 
related incorporation or exclusion of other 
actors, and the re-allocation of value-adding 
activities (Gereffi, 1994; Gibbon et al., 2008; 
Kaplinsky, 2000). Recent literature points out that 
external actors – governments, standard-setters, 
multilateral institutions, NGOs – can significantly 
influence GVC governance (Ponte and Sturgeon, 
2013; Riisgaard et al., 2010), especially in 
emerging industries like those for renewables, 
thus creating multi-polar chains (Ponte, 2014). In 
this report, we focus on the governance concept, 
which we operationalize by analysing selected 
characteristics and linkages of firms involved in 
establishing the jatropha niche in Ghana.
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3.  DATA AND METHODS 
The report builds on case studies of seven 
biofuel companies in Ghana, summarised in 
Table 1, along with analyses of the value chains, 
markets, and policy frameworks surrounding 
these companies. Data were collected through 
a combination of field visits, semi-structured 
interviews with key stakeholders and actors, 
a review of the grey and scientific literature, 
newspaper articles and webpages. The authors 
conducted a one-week exploratory field visit to 
Scanfarm Ghana (formerly ScanFuel AS) in 2012, 
followed by two weeks of field visits in December 
2014, including site visits to the other four major 
jatropha farms, Kimminic, Jatropha Africa, 
Biofuel Africa and Smart Oil. Semi-structured 
interviews were carried out with local managers 
of the five companies and with farm managers 
from Scanfarm, Kimminic and Jatropha Africa. 
The case studies of Galten and Goldstar relied 
on documentary analysis only as interviewees 
were unavailable. Another twelve interviews 
were conducted with researchers, NGOs and 
government officials. Half of the twenty interviews 
were recorded and transcribed, while for the 
rest minutes were prepared the same day based 
on detailed field notes. Historical information 
for describing the value-chain actors and the 
narrative of how the niche and regime evolved 
was collected through the interviews and then 
supplemented and triangulated with information 
from literature, web-based newspaper articles, 
company webpages and databases containing 
company information. Here we made extensive 
use of the Wayback Machine (www.web.archive.
org), an internet tool giving access to a vast 
library of captured old webpages. 
TABLE 1. LIST OF BIOFUEL COMPANIES DISCUSSED IN ARTICLE. SOURCE:  AUTHORS’ 
COMPILATION. 
Jatropha 
Africa Goldstar
Galten 
Ghana Kimminic
Scanfarm 
Ghana
Biofuel 
Africa Smart Oil
Country of origin United 
Kingdom
USA Israel Canada Norway Norway Italy
Mother company 
start-up date
Lion Bridge 
Venture, 
Sept. 2006
Goldstar 
Farms Ltd, 
early 2007
Galten, 
June 2006
Kimminic 
Corporation, 
March 2007
ScanFuel 
AS, Sept. 
2007
Norwegian 
Biofuel AS, 
Oct. 2007
Agroils, 
2006
Ghanaian 
subsidiary start-
up date
Jatropha 
Africa
Nov. 2006
Goldstar 
Biofuels, 
Early 2007 
Galten 
Ghana 
Early 2007 
Kimminic 
Estates March 
2007
Scanfuel 
September 
2007
Biofuel 
Africa, 
Oct. 2007
Smart Oil   
May 2008 
Size of investment Unknown 
(but small)
Unknown
US$ 2.4 
Million by 
2010 
US$ 16 Million 
by 2011
US$ 2.6 
Million by 
2009
US$ 7.1 
Million by 
2009
US$ 5.3 
Million by 
2015
Area claimed by 
company 120,000 ha 2,000,000 ha 100,000 ha 65,000 ha 304,000 ha 150,000 ha 105,000 ha
Area finally leased 50,000 ha 0 Unknown 65,000 ha 13,000 ha 10,696 ha 4,500 ha
Area cultivated 500 ha 0 400 ha 5,000 ha 350 ha 1,400 ha 720 ha
Planned product Seeds Biodiesel Biodiesel Biodiesel Crude oil Crude oil Crude oil
Achieved product Seeds None None Seeds Seeds Seeds Seeds
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4.  EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN PRIVATE-SECTOR 
JATROPHA INVESTMENT
Our presentation of the evolution of a niche for 
jatropha biofuels is divided into four periods 
(Figure 1), which coincide with the first phases 
of an emerging technology’s life-cycle or ‘hype 
cycle’ as described by (Gartner Inc., 2017) and 
discussed in (Ruef and Markard, 2010; Van Lente 
et al., 2013). Within this cycle of the maturity 
and adoption of the jatropha technology, the 
initial ‘technology trigger’ period from 1999-
2006 built up expectations, but there were few 
activities on the ground. The period of the ‘peak 
of inflated expectations’ from 2007-2008 was 
characterized by very high expectations, a rush 
for land and capital, and the establishment of 
farms and downstream facilities. The period 
from 2009-2011 was situated on the ‘slope 
of disillusionment’, with lower and mixed 
expectations, and when most companies closed 
down, only a few continuing to invest and 
operate. The last period from 2012-2016 was the 
‘trough of disillusionment’, when all companies 
except one hibernated or were liquidated. In the 
following, we describe the main events during 
each period at the landscape, regime and niche 
levels, which are important for the discussion in 
section five. Special emphasis is placed on the 
drivers in the global biofuel value chain. 
Peak of inflated expectations,  
2007 - 2008
Vi
si
bi
tli
ty
Slope of  
disillusionment, 
2009 - 2011
Slope of 
enlightenment
Plateau of productivity
Trough of disillusionment, 
2012 - 2016
Maturity
Technology trigger, 
1995 - 2006
FIGURE 1. THE EVOLUTION OF THE JATROPHA LIFE CYCLE OR HYPE CYCLE IN GHANA,  1995–
2016. THE X-AXIS MEASURES THE EVOLVING MATURIT Y AND APPLICATION OF THE JATROPHA 
TECHNOLOGY,  AND THE Y-AXIS THE LEVEL OF VISIBILIT Y AND INTEREST IN THE TECHNOLOGY. 
SOURCE:  ADAPTED FROM (GARTNER INC.,  2017). 
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4.1 TECHNOLOGY TRIGGER,  1995-2006
4.1.1 LANDSCAPE LEVEL
The climate agenda and a worldwide movement 
to substitute fossil fuels with renewable energy 
gained momentum in this period, and biofuel 
was one of the options which moved from the 
demonstration stage to the founding of a biofuels 
niche internationally, supported by national 
government regulations in the US and in a 
number of countries in Europe. A major signpost 
on the international climate agenda was the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development 
held in Johannesburg from 26 August to 4 
September 2002, which spurred political interest 
and political support for a more climate-friendly 
agenda.
The major change at the landscape level in this 
period was the increase in world market oil prices. 
After almost fifteen years of relatively stable 
fuel oil prices at US$ 15 to 20 per barrel, crude 
oil prices gradually increased to about US$ 60 
per barrel in 2006 (Figure 2). Another landscape 
driver was the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), which entered into force in 2005.
The combination of the environmental agenda, 
the CDM and the soaring oil prices stimulated 
international interest in biofuels. From 2000 to 
2006, biodiesel production rose about ten times 
from 0.8 to 6.5 billion litres per year, driven 
mainly by a dramatic policy change in 2005-2006, 
when several countries in the EU set targets and 
mandates for biofuels and introduced biofuel tax 
exemptions (REN21, 2006). Figure 3 shows global 
biofuel production in the four periods. 
FIGURE 2. CRUDE OIL  PRICES IN THE FOUR PERIODS. EUROPE BRENT SPOT PRICE FOB IN 
UNITED STATES DOLLARS. DATA SOURCE:  WWW.EIA.GOV ,  ACCESSED 10 JANUARY 2017. 
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FIGURE 3. GLOBAL PRODUCTION OF BIOFUELS IN THE FOUR PERIODS,  IN BILLION LITRES. DATA 
SOURCE:  (REN21,  2016)  AND PREVIOUS ISSUES. 
4.1.2 REGIME LEVEL
At the beginning of this period, the energy 
regime in Ghana was under strong government 
influence. Major energy infrastructure such as the 
Volta River Authority, a national utility that had 
been operating the large Akosombo hydropower 
plant from 1962, was owned and driven by the 
government (Edjekumhene et al., 2001). The 
Tema Oil Refinery was owned by the government, 
which set the prices for electricity and fuel, 
relatively speaking regardless of the costs (Bacon 
and Kojima, 2006). In line with other countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Ghana went through 
an important reform process in the 1990s, mainly 
driven by conditions set by the World Bank. The 
objective of the reform was to introduce cost-
reflective prices of electricity and to introduce 
competition in the production sector by partial 
privatisation and the unbundling of the energy 
sector into separate production, transmission 
and distribution companies. In Ghana this 
process started in 1994 and resulted in a power 
sector reform adopted in 2000 (Edjekumhene et 
al., 2001). 
Until 1997, Ghana’s electricity generation 
was fully based on the 1200 MW Akosombo 
hydropower plant, but after a number of serious 
power supply crises due to upstream drought, 
new thermal power plants were added in 1997. 
These plants were expected to be partly fuelled 
by the West African Gas Pipeline, which was 
scheduled to supply cheap natural gas from 
Nigeria from as early as 2002 (Edjekumhene et al., 
2001). However, for several reasons the pipeline 
did not start operating until December 2008.1
Until 2005, petroleum product prices were both 
regulated and subsidized by the government, 
and prices were increased at irregular intervals, 
sometimes by large amounts. In January 2003, 
the government introduced a pricing formula 
linking domestic prices to world prices and 
raised fuel prices by approximately 90 percent. 
However, during 2004 the government, which 
faced elections in December, continued to 
subsidize prices, and the subsidy to the Tema Oil 
Refinery continued to grow until it amounted to 
2.2 percent of GDP. Finally, after the re-election of 
the president oil prices were deregulated, giving 
rise to an immediate consumer price increase of 
about 50% in February 2005 (Bacon and Kojima, 
2006).
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The new oil-dependent power plants, the delay 
of the gas pipeline and the increases in the 
number of private cars and in oil prices caused an 
extraordinary rise in the costs of imported energy 
during the early 2000s. Energy imports therefore 
became an important policy question related to 
Ghana’s trade balance. The draft biofuel policy 
drawn up by the Energy Commission in 2005 
emphasised that Ghana’s oil import bill had 
grown from US$561 million in 2000 to US$816.6 
million in 2004, equalling 19.7% of the country’s 
total merchandise import, or 28% of total export 
earnings (Energy Commission, 2005). During this 
short period, the energy regime experienced 
significant changes in terms of deregulation 
and loss of government control, alongside 
an increased dependence on energy imports. 
Energy security and national energy production 
therefore became an important part of the 
political agenda. 
In the area of biofuels, in 2003 a niche actor 
presented his plans to build the first biofuel 
factory in Ghana. This pushed the government 
to make a preliminary analysis of the production 
and use of biofuels and to set up four government-
led multi-stakeholder committees to discuss 
and draft a biofuel strategy. The committees 
included representatives from the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and the Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture (MOFA) plus stakeholders 
from the petroleum industry, the private sector, 
academia and civil society. After almost two years 
of discussion the committee came up with a draft 
biofuel policy issued in 2005 (Brew-Hammond, 
2009; Energy Commission, 2005).
The first proposal for a biofuel policy was 
ambitious and broad in scope. It recommended 
among several other initiatives that all 
government diesel vehicles should switch to 
20% biodiesel blends (B20). It further proposed 
to remove all taxes on biofuels and to put a 
small levy on fossil fuels, the revenues of which 
should be used to subsidize biofuels. Finally it 
suggested that a special group within the Energy 
Commission should be mandated to manage the 
development and implementation of a biofuel 
programme (Energy Commission, 2005). In 2006 a 
revised draft of the biofuel policy was submitted 
to the government, including mandatory blends 
of gasohol and biodiesel at five percent (5%) by 
2010 and ten percent (10%) by 2015. The Strategic 
National Energy Plan (SNEP) published in 2006 
had the same blending targets (Brew-Hammond, 
2009; Energy Commission, 2006).
4.1.3 NICHE LEVEL
Donor organisations such as GTZ, UNIDO and 
UNDP played a major role in the promotion of 
jatropha for biofuel production in West Africa 
during the early years. GTZ operated the first 
jatropha project in Mali in 1987, which focused 
on mapping existing jatropha hedges within the 
framework of a renewable energy programme 
(Henning, 1998). A second jatropha project ran 
from 1993 to 1997, aiming to use jatropha oil not 
only as a fuel, but also to activate a circular system 
combining ecological, economic and income-
generating effects. Reinhard Henning was the 
project leader of the two GTZ projects and became 
a strong international champion promoting 
jatropha as a biofuel. Already in 1996 he had 
established the jatropha website www.jatropha.
de, which served as an important source of 
information for practitioners until 2010, when new 
knowledge on jatropha cultivation and processing 
became available based on the experience of 
large-scale practices (Henning, 2009).
UNIDO and FIDA started a pilot project on the 
multifunctional platform (MFP) in 1994 in Mali 
and Burkina Faso. Based on this experience, 
UNDP launched a large project in 1999, which 
set out to establish 450 MFPs in Mali from 1999 to 
2004, of which around 70 (15%) would be fuelled 
by jatropha oil (Burn and Coche, 2001).2 UNDP 
then went on to establish two projects in Ghana 
in 2001. The first supported a women’s group in 
Gbimsi village to establish a four-hectare pilot 
jatropha plot and a press for pressing jatropha 
oil to use in running their shea butter processing 
plant (Mensah, 2009). The second and larger 
project was the ADRA/UNDP/GEF jatropha 
project, which planted between 2000 and 2400 
hectares of jatropha in an out-grower scheme 
(Amissah-Arthur et al., 2007). A major problem 
encountered by this project was to find a market 
for the produce (ibid.). There were also problems 
with pests and low yields. Hence most farmers 
eventually cut down their jatropha trees, and the 
project’s status since 2007 remains unclear. 
PRIVATE-SECTOR ENGAGEMENT
The first private-sector activities to consider 
jatropha as a source of biofuel production can 
be traced back to 1999, when Mr Onua Amoah, 
a Ghanaian industrialist, set out to investigate 
its feasibility. Through his company IABP, he 
started a pilot research plantation for jatropha 
and small-scale production of jatropha oil for 
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testing (Amoah, 2006a). Amoah claimed that he 
had developed an improved jatropha species 
which could yield nine tonnes of seeds (thirteen 
tonnes of fruit) per hectare, compared to the wild 
jatropha species, which produced only three to 
five tonnes of seeds per hectare (Amoah, 2006a). 
Amoah planned to start a large-scale biofuel-
processing plant in 2003,3 but this plan failed 
when investors pulled out of the newly established 
Ghana Bio Energy Limited for undisclosed 
reasons.4 In 2007, Amoah had established a 500 
tonne/year test plant for producing biodiesel 
from jatropha oil, which, however, was not 
operational, mainly due to a lack of feedstock at 
the time (Amissah-Arthur et al., 2007). In 2007 he 
claimed that AIBP had secured funding from a 
credit facility of the ECOWAS Bank for Investment 
and Development (EBID) to construct a 120,000 
tonne/per annum jatropha processing plant 
(ibid.). Amoah was a strong campaigner and 
good at convincing investors and government 
officials of the benefits of jatropha. He is also 
said to have been instrumental in establishing 
the Government’s National Jatropha Plantation 
Initiative (NJPI), launched in late 2006 (Amoah, 
2006b) (see below).
Another champion, Dr Christian Kofi Marfo, an 
agricultural scientist, established a company 
called Biofuel 1, which made its own test farm 
of about 280 hectares (Marfo, 2014). Like AIBP, 
Biofuel 1 had established a pressing facility, 
which by 2006 had a capacity of 2000 tonnes of 
seeds per month (Amissah-Arthur et al., 2007). 
Most of the test plantation, however, burned in 
a bush fire, causing a large loss for the company. 
Biofuel 1 also claimed to have access to 12,000 
hectares of land in the Brong-Ahafo region, 
although it could not finance this (Amissah-
Arthur et al., 2007; Marfo, 2014).
A third local champion was Mr Kwabena 
Frimpong-Boateng, well-known in Ghana as a 
university professor, a cardiothoracic surgeon, 
and the founder of the National Cardiothoracic 
Centre and the Ghana Red Cross society. In 2006 
he also sought nomination to run for President 
for the National Patriotric Party (NPP) in 2008, 
but failed. Frimpong-Boateng had a jatropha 
plantation in Winneba. He also worked closely 
together with Onua Amoah and in August 
2007, together with Onua Amoah and others, 
he acquired lands for jatropha cultivation at 
Sawla, Wa, Pusiga, Techiman and Nkoranza.5 
It is interesting to note here that the wining 
NPP candidate and later President of Ghana, 
Nana Akufo-Addo, was also close to actors in 
the biofuel venture. For example, his Director of 
Campaign and Operations for the presidential 
elections in 2008, Raymond Okudzeto, who was 
an important politician in the National Patriotic 
Party (NPP), had already become the national 
director of Galten Biofuel in December 2007. 
GOVERNMENT
The National Jatropha Plantation Initiative was 
launched in late 2006 and was supported by the 
government with US$ 1.6 million (Amissah-Arthur 
et al., 2007; Biopact, 2007). This government 
initiative planned to develop one million 
hectares of jatropha plantations on available idle 
and degraded lands in phases over the next five 
to six years. Implementation of the plan was led 
by an inter-ministerial government committee, 
chaired by the Minister of Food and Agriculture, 
and including Amoah as a member. Plantations 
were to be developed in all the districts of the 
country. By early 2007, thirty districts had been 
selected for the first phase establishing the first 
40,000 hectares. The project included production 
of a large number of seedlings delivered by AIBP 
(Amoah, 2006b).6 
Towards the end of this period, international 
actors such as potential investors and fuel 
importers were present in the national arena 
searching for business opportunities. One such 
actor was the British jatropha oil company 
D1, which initiated negotiations with Kofi 
Marfo and his company Biofuel 1. D1 exported 
seeds from Ghana through a firm to which Kofi 
Marfo introduced it, but D1 never established a 
company or plantation in Ghana (Marfo, 2014).
The strong push by niche actors for changes to the 
energy regime was aided by a UNCTAD/ECOWAS 
conference in 2016 on CDM and the financing 
of biofuels and jatropha plantation projects, at 
which Amoah gave two speeches (Amoah, 2006a, 
2006b; UNCTAD, 2006).
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4.2 PEAK OF INFLATED EXPECTATIONS,  2007-2008
4.2.1 LANDSCAPE LEVEL
The global demand for biodiesel increased 
rapidly during this period, rising from 6.5 billion 
litres per year in 2007 to 15.6 billion litres in 2008 
(REN21, 2012). At the landscape level, three 
drivers were mainly responsible for this growth. 
The first was strong and continued policy support 
to biofuels in an increasing number of countries, 
with a focus on targets, blending mandates and 
tax exemptions (REN21, 2009, 2008). The second 
was the large increase in crude oil prices from 
US$ 80 in June 2006 to US$ 140 in September 
2008, just before the onset of the global financial 
crisis, which drew oil prices back down again and 
tightened up financial markets. A third driver was 
the CDM, which in this period attracted a lot of 
attention as a potential financing mechanism for 
biofuel projects in developing countries. 
There were also factors impeding niche 
development at this level. Global food prices 
climbed to their highest levels since the 1970s 
and initiated a global debate on ‘food versus fuel’. 
The FAO, the World Bank and the OECD published 
reports claiming that biofuel production was an 
important driver of the increase in food prices 
and raising questions about the potential of 
biofuels to reduce CO2 emissions (FAO, 2008; 
Mitchell, 2008; OECD, 2008; Romijn and Caniëls, 
2011). Linked to this debate was the discussion 
on large-scale land-grabbing in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, initiated in June 2007 by a European NGO 
using examples of ‘land-grabbing’ for biofuel 
production from Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, 
Nigeria and Ghana (GRAIN, 2007). The same 
year, the first critical research was published 
questioning the common, positive perceptions of 
jatropha regarding yields and resilience (Achten 
et al., 2008; Jongschaap et al., 2007).
4.2.2 REGIME LEVEL
The draft biofuel policy of 2006 was not approved 
by the Ghanaian government, and the draft 
National Energy Law under preparation was 
delayed (Brew-Hammond, 2009). The work on 
biofuel standards continued, but no standards 
were adopted (Antwi et al., 2010). The discovery 
of offshore oil and gas in 2007, along with Amoah’s 
death the same year, reduced the government’s 
interest in biofuels, and it gradually withdrew 
from biofuel activities while still providing 
support to private investors (Boamah, 2014a; 
KITE, 2014). 
4.2.3 NICHE LEVEL
2007 and 2008 witnessed high levels of optimism 
and activity among niche actors. There was a 
rush for land, and rumours about the acquisition 
of large amounts of land for biofuels were 
widespread.  Schoneveld et al. (2010) estimated 
that by August 2009 there were fifteen active 
biofuel companies, of which thirteen were 
cultivating jatropha. Collectively they claimed 
to have access to 1,075,000 hectares of land, 
of which 730,000 hectares were in the forest-
savannah transition zone in the Brong Ahafo 
and northern Ashanti regions (Schoneveld et al., 
2010). By late 2009, more than twenty foreign 
companies had acquired land to grow crops for 
biofuel production, mostly for export (Dafrallah 
et al., 2010). It is uncertain how many of these 
companies had been established before 2009, but 
the companies analysed in this report all started 
between 2006 and 2008 (Table 1). In the following 
we will briefly describe these businesses with 
reference to their ownership, management and 
business strategies. 
JATROPHA AFRICA is directed by Ohene Akoto 
and was established in Ghana in November 2006 
as a subsidiary of the United Kingdom-based 
company Lion Bridge Ventures, which in turn 
was started in September 2006 by Clive Murray 
Cooker.7 Lion Bridge Ventures was a small start-
up company with five investors, two of whom 
were Ghanaian residents. The Ghanaian director 
and co-founder of Jatropha Africa holds a MBA 
from the University of Cape Coast. According 
to the company’s first webpage from 2007, 
the company was started with the objective of 
‘growing seedlings, contract planting, harvesting 
and selling oil seed as feedstock to bio diesel 
companies and farmers’.8 The company acquired 
50,000 hectares of land in Kawampe, Gulumpe 
and Kadelso, all communities in Kintampo 
North District in the Brong Ahafo Region (Kite, 
2012).9 According to the operational manager, Mr 
Ampadu, Jatropha Africa works with local chiefs 
on a shared profit basis and only pays for land 
which is developed. Farmers can grow crops on 
the land until the company needs it, and after 
planting jatropha they can intercrop it with 
groundnuts or other crops (Ampadu, 2014). The 
company planted up to 500 hectares in the first 
few years.10 In the beginning they worked with 
Onua Amoah and got the best seeds with high 
yields and oil content (Ampadu, 2014).
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GOLDSTAR BIOFUELS, managed by Jack 
Holden, started operating in Ghana in early 2007 
(Amissah-Arthur et al., 2007) as a subsidiary of 
a Gold Star Farms Ltd, managed by his wife, the 
Ghanaian Diana Holden.11 Gold Star Farms was 
a joint venture between two US citizens, Jack 
Holden and Lloyd Benton Sharp.12 Goldstar 
biofuels claimed that they had access to two 
million hectares (five million acres) of land in 
Ghana (Dogbevi, 2008). According to Goldstar’s 
webpage from 2008, Goldstar intended to be a 
‘vertically integrated company that starts by 
growing the renewable feedstock, extracting 
the oils from the seeds of the jatropha fruit, then 
refining the oil into biodiesel and last but not 
least pumping the fuel into fuel tanks around the 
world’.11 
GALTEN GHANA was established in June 2007 
as a subsidiary of Galten, the Israeli clean-tech 
start-up, founded by Doron Levi and Shlomi 
Jonas in 2006. According to the webpage, Shlomi 
Jonas had served as CEO in medical supply 
companies and biotechnology companies in 
Israel, while Doron Levis, chairman and COO, 
has a degree in business management and has 
been involved in sales and marketing, as well as 
new business start-ups. The chairman of Galten 
Ghana was a Ghanaian businessman and at the 
time a leading politician, being responsible for 
the campaign of the NPP presidential candidate, 
Nana Akufo-Addo in 2008.13 In a press release 
dated 9 September 2007, it is stated that ‘Galten 
will raise $10 million from a group of investors 
led by UK private equity fund Capital Partners’. 
Galten states on the webpage that its business 
model ‘is to get hold of large land areas, mainly 
on the African Continent for jatropha plantations 
as the source of bio-diesel’.14 According to a press 
release from June 2006, the government of Ghana 
and the Central Region had ‘assured viability of 
200,000 hectares for Galten’s Biofuel projects’.15
KIMMINIC CORPORATION was founded by 
George Amponsem, a Canadian Ghanaian, 
in March 2007 for the purpose of biofuel 
development and started operating in Ghana 
through its fully owned subsidiary, Kimminic 
Estates Limited (Kite, 2012).16 It began land 
preparation in February 2008, the first plantation 
being established in April 2008 (Boamah and 
Overå, 2016). Mr Amponsem was a management 
consultant. From 2005, he ran his own consultancy 
start-up, Gamps Consulting Service, with his wife 
Heidi Amponsem. George Amponsem and his 
wife had experience of management consulting 
from working for PWC Consulting for seven and 
four years respectively, and they also held PhDs 
in business administration and in organizational 
development and marketing respectively.17 Mr 
Amponsem did not have any specific experience 
of the farming or oil sectors (Marfo, 2014), 
except for having been raised on a cocoa farm in 
Ghana and doing management consultancy for 
oil companies. The size and origin of the initial 
investment in Kimminic remains unclear, but 
according to Boamah and Overå (2016) it came 
from Canadian investors and Ghanaian residents 
in Canada, including Mr Amponsem.18 
Kimminic’s strategy was to become a vertically 
integrated biofuel company, including all 
elements of the value chain from cultivation to 
export of refined biofuel. The strategy was large-
scale production in a combination with manual 
and mechanised farming methods. Kimminic 
wanted to scale up to a size that would make 
it profitable to refine the biofuel to biodiesel in 
its own factory (Marfo, 2014). Land negotiations 
and experimentation with jatropha cultivation 
started in 2007. The company entered into a 
forty-year joint venture leasing contract with 
local chiefs in councils in the Brong-Ahafo 
Region. The leasing agreement involved, among 
other conditions, granting an annual profit share 
of 25% to the communities. The total land area 
was 65,000 ha, divided into four plots. The first 
jatropha plantation was established in April 2008 
(Boamah, 2015).
SCANFUEL LTD was established in September 
2007 as a fully owned subsidiary of the Norwegian 
Scanfuel As, founded by Thor Hesselberg and his 
wife Merete Hesselberg.19 Thor Hesselberg was 
at the time CEO and founder of NorthPoint AS, a 
start-up within the telecoms sector,20 which he 
founded as a student in 1995 and which he and 
his wife had been running since 2000. Hesselberg 
held a MBA, and his wife also had a business 
administration background.21 Agnar Gravdahl, 
a well-connected businessman from Stavanger, 
was chairman of the board.22 He held 10% of 
the shares in the company, while the Hesselberg 
couple held 60% and IKM invest another 20%. 
The company, which was established through 
contacts of a Ghanaian national living in Norway, 
leased 13,000 hectares of land from a local 
chief, Nana Sarpong, who was a lawyer and 
former minister of interior and health. In 2008 
the legal documentation was completed at the 
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Land Commission (Scanfarm, 2011). The original 
plan was to grow jatropha for the production 
of vegetable oil for subsequent processing 
into biodiesel. A jatropha seed garden was first 
established on land belonging to the University of 
Ghana using a Malaysian seed variety (Scanfarm, 
2011). By December 2008, US$ 2.6 million (NOK 
22 million) had been invested in Ghana out of a 
planned investment of US$ 5.2 million (NOK 40 
million).23
BIOFUEL AFRICA was established in October 
2007 as a joint venture and a fully owned 
subsidiary of Norwegian Biofuel AS (Boamah, 
2010). Jan Reinås, a well-connected businessman 
in Norway, was chairman of the board. The 
main investor in Biofuel AS was the investment 
company Nordfuel, later known as Perennial 
Biofuel, which had been founded in 2007 (Helvig, 
2014).24, 25 The Norwegian manager of Biofuel 
Africa, Arne Helvig, came with experience of 
the pharmaceutical industry in Norway (Helvig, 
2014). Steiner Kolnes was trained as an engineer 
in automation and had been working in Ghana 
since 2003 on a telecoms project. However, he 
had been raised on a farm in Norway, and in 
2004/2005 he became interested in jatropha 
and was involved in testing growth conditions 
together with AngloGold Ashanti in Ghana.26 
Biofuel Africa started with the objective of 
becoming a vertically integrated biofuel 
company, capturing all elements of the value 
chain, from cultivation to the export of crude 
jatropha oil for refining in Europe by buyers 
(Helvig, 2014). The strategy was to perform 
large-scale and highly mechanised farming and 
primary processing in order to benefit from 
economies of scale throughout the value chain, 
ultimately to reach a scale that would interest oil 
companies and refineries in Norway and the EU. 
The company established an 850-hectare test 
farm in Sugakope25 and another farm in Alipe, 
a village in Central Gonja District in northern 
Ghana, in November 2007. Due to opposition 
from local NGOs, individual environmental 
activists and the Ghanaian press, Biofuel Africa 
abandoned the farm in Alipe and moved to a 
new project site in Yendi District, also in northern 
Ghana, where a new jatropha plantation was 
established (Boamah, 2010). In February 2008, 
Biofuel Africa received approval from the 
Ghanaian Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) for a jatropha biodiesel project on land 
areas of 23,762 hectares in Central Gonja and 
Yendi Districts (Boamah, 2010). Jatropha Africa 
had options to lease a further 150,000 hectares 
from local chiefs at a specific price, but with no 
obligations to exploit these options (Helvig, 2014; 
Kolnes, 2009a). In 2008, Jatropha Africa cleared 
1100 hectares of land and planted about 400 
hectares with jatropha (Boamah, 2010). 
SMART OIL LTD, managed by Anthony Darko, 
was incorporated in May 2008 as a Ghanaian 
subsidiary of SmartOil 2. SmartOil 2 had been 
founded in 2006 by Mr Darko and a small Italian 
consultancy company, Agroils, with equal 
amounts of financial inputs from the two parties 
(Darko, 2014).27 Agroils was a start-up founded 
in 2006 in Florence, Italy, by a group of engineers 
specialising in jatropha.28 The staff of Agroils had 
been visiting projects worldwide, participated in 
conferences and done literature research,29 but 
according to Mr Darko, the knowledge available 
on jatropha was still very limited (Darko, 2014). 
Mr Darko did not have any experience of farming 
or agro-business, but he had a background in 
economics and information technology, as well 
as international experience as a former manager 
in the USA.30 The first business plan for Smart 
Oil was to experiment with jatropha cultivation 
in Ghana, and consequently Smart Oil started up 
with a ten-hectare experimental trial plantation 
in June 2008. At this stage the financial input was 
limited. 
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4.3 SLOPE OF DISILLUSIONMENT,  2009-2011
4.3.1 LANDSCAPE LEVEL
The beginning of this period was characterized 
by the global financial crisis, which made 
international financial capital more averse to 
risky investments. Crude oil prices plunged from 
US$ 140 per barrel in September 2008 to US$ 
40 in late 2008, and then slowly recovered to 
US$ 110 by January 2011, where they remained 
during 2011 (Figure 2). The importance of the 
CDM as an incentive for biofuel projects was 
gradually reduced along with the price drop of 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) to below 
US$ 5 dollars by the end of 2011. 
The financial crisis and the drop in oil prices 
reduced the annual growth rate of biodiesel 
demand from above 50% to only 10% (REN21, 
2012, 2010). This had short-term implications 
for the biodiesel industry: by early 2009, for 
example, German biodiesel production was only 
60% of capacity, and several factories had closed 
down (Romijn and Caniëls, 2011). Nevertheless, 
the construction of new plants continued 
during the period. In 2009, for example, Neste 
Oil Corporation began constructing the largest 
biofuel plant in the EU with a capacity of 0.9 
billion litres per year, and traditional policy 
elements such as blending mandates and tax 
exemptions spread to more countries. In 2009 
the EU Renewable Energy Directive, which 
requires 10% of transportation fuels to come 
from renewables by 2020, set the first mandatory 
sustainability standards for biofuels, and the USA 
introduced the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) 
(REN21, 2012, 2010).
4.3.2 REGIME LEVEL
Energy security concerns had to a large extent 
driven the initial governmental biofuel agenda, 
and the preparation for national oil production 
reduced this concern.31 Consequently, the 
new government, established in January 2009, 
welcomed the biofuels idea, though it was more 
concerned with the potential effects on food 
security (Boamah, 2014a). This can be deduced 
from the National Energy Policy document and 
the Energy Sector Strategy and Development Plan 
issued in February 2010: both documents urge 
that biofuel development be balanced against 
food security, while at the same time supporting 
the development of a biofuel industry and 
private-sector investment. Interestingly, these 
policy documents did not repeat the blending 
targets and financial incentives announced in 
SNEP 2006 (Ministry of Energy, 2010a, 2010b). 
In August of the same year, the Energy 
Commission submitted a new draft bioenergy 
policy, which repeated the blending targets and 
the tax exemption of biofuels. It further proposed 
several new supporting incentives, in particular: 
i) a guaranteed market price for biofuel; ii) zero 
import duty and VAT on equipment for the 
processing of biofuels; iii) income tax relief for ten 
years of operation for biofuel companies; and iv) 
tax holidays for feedstock-producing companies 
using labour-intensive methods (Energy 
Commission, 2010). The draft bioenergy policy 
also introduced an incentive to use biofuels in 
Ghana by suggesting levies and taxes be imposed 
on biofuel exports. The draft policy also specified 
institutional roles in order to reduce the existing 
problems caused by the unclear mandates of the 
different institutions mentioned in the policy 
document, notably the Energy Commission, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Ministry 
of Forestry and Agriculture, the Ghana Standards 
Board, the National Petroleum Authority (NPA), 
the Land Commission and the Houses of Chiefs. 
The status of the draft bioenergy policy remains 
unclear to this date, but while the Renewable 
Energy Act (Act 832), adopted in 2011, contained 
provisions for further regulation of the biofuel 
sector, including licencing the production and 
transport of biofuels, it did not provide any 
concrete policies with respect to blending targets 
or tax exemptions (GOG, 2011).  
These remarkable differences in announced 
biofuel policies from the government and the 
Energy Commission respectively illustrate 
the different positions taken on biofuel issues 
between the Energy Commission on the one 
hand and the Ministry of Energy on the other 
hand. The opposing positions are also clearly 
expressed by two leading figures in the two 
institutions: Abeeku Brew-Hammond, Head 
of the Energy Commission, who expressed a 
positive attitude towards biofuels in October 
2009 (Brew-Hammond, 2009), and Wisdom 
Ahiataku-Togobo, Renewable Energy Expert at 
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the Ministry of Energy (from December 2010, 
Director of Renewable Energy), who in May 2009 
expressed a critical view of biofuels. In particular, 
he remarked that the costs of biofuels were 
not competitive with fossil fuels in the national 
market, even at a crude oil price of US$ 140 per 
barrel. He also warned that this export-oriented 
industry would challenge food production, as 
biofuels are produced on fertile lands (Ahiataku-
Togobo and Ofosu-Ahenkorah, 2009).
Since 2006, the political focus has gradually 
shifted from concerns about fuel imports 
towards how to resolve the recurrent crises in 
power supply. Both the energy policy document 
of 2010 and the Renewable Energy Act focus on 
increasing energy production capacity through 
independent power producers, while the Energy 
Act describes in detail the conditions for feed-in 
tariffs for renewable energy, especially solar PV 
(Kemausuor et al., 2015). 
4.3.3 NICHE LEVEL 
The first two years of this period saw a 
continuation of critical reports from NGOs and 
the Ghanaian press focusing on land-grabbing 
and the destruction of the environment and 
local livelihoods, initiated by a Ghanaian NGO in 
August 2008 (Nyari, 2008). This debate influenced 
both niche and regime actors and contributed to 
the difficulties experienced in attracting finance 
for biofuel companies, due to other landscape 
factors such as the international financial crisis, 
the fall in oil prices and the reduced importance 
of the CDM. In the following we will provide a 
more detailed account of how the six companies 
fared during this period of disillusionment for 
niche development.
JATROPHA AFRICA 
Lion Bridge Ventures went into voluntary 
liquidation in June 2009, and Jatropha Africa 
was taken over by Clive Cooker and Ohene Akoto 
(Ampadu, 2014). After the liquidation, Ohene 
Akoto was still searching for investment funds to 
develop the large amounts of land acquired by 
Jatropha Africa. Thus, a blog from August 2009, 
published on the Africa Sustainable Energy & 
Environment Platform, said that ‘Jatropha Africa 
Ltd. is soliciting approximately US$ 65 million 
for the development of available land, support 
equipment, a crushing plant, local biodiesel 
plant, generators, on water logistics and other 
operational costs until cash flows are self-
sustaining in approximately three years. From 
year four and through subsequent years revenue 
is projected to be US$ 97 million with exceptional 
profitability’.32
During the period 2009-11, Jatropha Africa neither 
expanded its planted area nor established any 
pressing facilities, indicating that it had failed to 
attract any significant investments. The existing 
farm continued operation, however, in close 
cooperation with local communities. Interviews 
did not reveal any exact information about the 
quantities harvested during this period, but in 
late 2001 the company announced that it had 
sold the first ten tonnes of jatropha seeds to 
Japan, indicating a much lower harvest than the 
four tonnes per hectare expressed earlier by the 
company (Kite, 2012).33
In cooperation with several European universities, 
Jatropha Africa received EU funding for a 
capacity-building project whose main objective 
was to create sustainable, non-food bio-oil 
supply chains. The project had a budget of one 
million euros, involved multiple countries, and 
ran from late 2009 to late 2012. Participation in 
the project is likely to have created an important 
learning and networking space for Jatropha 
Africa,34 while the tangible outcome for the local 
community was a small jatropha oil press and 
a jatropha-fuelled generator set up to provide 
electricity for the community (Kite, 2012)..
GOLDSTAR
According to Dafrallah et al. (2010: 43, referring 
to Jack Holden), ‘Gold Star has already secured 
the commitment of farmers to grow the crop on 
approximately 5 million acres of land. Two million 
acres of the targeted plantations are currently 
under cultivation throughout the country, with 
the exception of the Western region’. According 
to the same source, at that time the company 
claimed to be constructing a processing plant 
at Nkawkaw in the Eastern Region to produce 
biodiesel for exports. However, as mentioned 
by Dogbevi (2012), Goldstar had ‘gone silent’ by 
2012. 
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GALTEN 
By early 2009, Galten had planted 99 hectares 
out of an intended 1000 hectares on a single site 
(Shpurer, 2009).35 This seems to be the basis 
for the rather optimistic announcement on the 
company’s webpage on 10 March 2009 that ‘the 
first jatropha plantation is already in operation, 
with the next 10,000 hectares in the pipeline out 
of a total 100,000 hectares available to Galten’.36 
According to a Powerpoint presentation at the 
Israeli Biomass Conference in 2010, Galten 
was employing forty workers that year, had 
established a nursery with a capacity of one 
million seedlings and had planted a thousand 
hectares of jatropha.37 We could not find any 
documentation to verify that Galten actually 
planted this amount of land, and it also remains 
unclear how much capital Galten raised from 
its start in 2007 until 2009. A newspaper article 
states that the stakeholder equity was around 
US$ 85,000 in March 2009 when Galten tried to 
raise money on the Israeli stock market (Shpurer, 
2009). According to the conference presentation 
just mentioned, total investment was US$ 2.35 
Million in 2010.39
KIMMINIC 
In late 2009, Kimminic received a very important 
input of knowledge and experience when 
Kofi Marfo, the owner of Biofuel1, became 
General Manager of Kimminic Estates Ltd. This 
capacity increase became possible because the 
300-hectare plantation owned by Kofi Marfo was 
burnt in a bush fire in 2007. Mr Marfo included his 
farm as an asset, but without being shareholder 
in the company. At this time, Kimminic was 
already cultivating 2400 hectares at Ejura Mr. 
Marfo introduced advanced management, 
remuneration and control systems at the 
four plots in Bredi, Abease, Yeji and Dinkra in 
the Brong Ahafo region (Marfo, 2014). The 
arrangement, which left 25% of the profits to 
the local communities, allowed jatropha to 
be intercropped with maize and had various 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) elements 
in the business model, meant that Kimminic 
avoided the strong local and NGO resistance 
encountered by other large-scale projects 
(Boamah, 2015). By the end of 2011, Kimminic 
had planted about 5000 hectares with jatropha 
and cleared 7500 hectares (Kite, 2012; Marfo, 
2014). 
During 2009-11 Kimminic Corporations pursued 
a plan to become a fully vertically integrated 
company, and besides Kimminic Estates Ltd, two 
new fully owned subsidiaries, Kimminic Oil Ltd 
and Kimminic Logistics Ltd, were established. 
Kimminic Oil started construction of a biofuel 
(biodiesel) refinery close to the main plantation in 
Yeji. The refinery was a turnkey project involving 
four international companies. The plant was 
dimensioned to process 400 tonnes of seeds per 
day, equivalent to a harvest from 80,000 ha. This 
allowed the treatment of seeds from out-grower 
schemes and other companies in the area such as 
the nearby Smart Oil (Marfo, 2014).
Kimminic Logistics was established to produce 
and transport crude jatropha oil, biodiesel and 
organic fertilizer from jatropha for the national 
and international markets. Locating the biodiesel 
refinery at Yeji, close to Lake Volta, meant that 
the biodiesel could be transported easily and 
cheaply on barges on the lake to the Akosumbo 
inland port, from where it would be transported 
by truck to the port of Tema. Seedcake was to be 
exported as organic fertilizer in pellets or, as a 
second choice, to be burned in a thermal power 
plant for electricity production (Marfo, 2014). 
Kimminic was a free-zone company, meaning 
that it had to export at least 70% of the produce 
and sell the rest in the domestic market. To 
guarantee a local market, and to ensure that 
the government would not place restrictions 
on Kimminic exporting more than the 70%, 
the company pushed the government for a 
blending mandate. It also negotiated with local 
oil companies to set up a blending facility. 
However, Kimminic did had supply agreements 
with EU oil companies, as well as with an aviation 
company, and so did not depend strongly on the 
development of a domestic market (Marfo, 2014).
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SCANFUEL 
Jatropha seedlings, produced in the nursery 
established in 2008, were planted on 350 
hectares of land in April 2009, and the first crop 
was harvested in August 2009. The seeds were 
not processed but sold to a buyer in Burkina Faso 
(Scanfarm, 2011). In 2009 a study was carried out 
to investigate the feasibility of converting the land 
to food production, and by 2010 the farm shifted 
from jatropha to maize cultivation (Wisborg, 
2012). With this shift Scanfuel changed its name 
to Scanfarm, and the founding Hesselberg couple 
left the company in December 2010.38 The same 
year Scanfarm received a reward for being the 
National Best Maize farmer in 2010 (Wisborg, 
2012). 
In early 2009 Scanfuel was accused in the 
Ghanaian and international media of land-
grabbing and the destruction of local farming 
livelihoods. This media storm seems to have its 
origin in an article in the Norwegian newspaper 
Aftonbladet in December 2008, quoting 
Hesselberg as having access to 400,000 ha.39 It 
included articles in Ghana Business News in May 
2009, which were corroborated by research done 
by a Norwegian researcher during April and May 
2009, published by the Norwegian NGO SPIRE 
(Bull, 2009). Wisborg (2012) and Boamah (2014a) 
include a comprehensive account of these 
events. According to both sources, the Scanfarm 
management said in interviews that that the 
decision to change from fuel to food production 
was purely a commercial one and was not 
influenced by the accusations of land-grabbing 
or the food versus fuel debate.
BIOFUEL AFRICA
In November 2008 BioFuel Africa Ltd faced 
financial problems due to a lack of funding 
caused partly by the global financial crisis and 
partly by opposition to the project described 
below (Boamah, 2010). According to Arne Helvig, 
the company was in serious negotiations with 
Neste Oil and Statoil over the establishment of 
a joint venture. In early 2009 BioFuel Africa was 
close to achieving a financial input from Statoil 
against a 30% ownership, but the financial crisis 
induced Statoil to change its strategy and revert 
to its ‘core business’, and it left the biofuel sector 
as a result. Biofuel Africa went bankrupt in March 
2009, along with its mother company, Biofuel 
AS, prompted by (undocumented) allegations of 
corruption from Statoil, which meant an end to 
any remaining opportunities for external finance 
(Boamah, 2011; Helvig, 2014). At the time, Biofuel 
Africa had invested about US$ 10 million in 
the Ghanaian operations. The main investor, 
Perennial Bioenergy AS, has since gone out of 
business, and the founders of BioFuel Africa, Arne 
Helvig and Steinar Kolnes, lost equity of about 
US$ 0.5 million (NOK 4 million). At that time they 
had planted 550 hectares of jatropha. 
Following the bankruptcy, Kolnes and Helvig 
tried to continue the operations in Ghana 
under the name of Solar Harvest Ltd, which was 
fully owned by the Norwegian company, Solar 
Harvest AS.40 They first attempted to establish 
food production in connection with the existing 
jatropha farm (Boamah, 2010), but at the time 
of fieldwork in 2014, Solar Harvest had instead 
established a 400-hectare rice farm in an irrigated 
area in Botanga close to Tamale.41 By then the 
jatropha plantations had become overgrown 
with weeds, and the machinery had been left 
partly dismantled on the ground.
SMART OIL
According to Friends of the Earth (Burley and 
Bebb, 2010), by 2010 Smart Oil had obtained 
105,000 hectares of land. This figure may be 
exaggerated, but according to a captured 
webpage from Smart Oil in April 2010,42 the firm 
had entered a Memorandum of Understanding 
with the Paramount Chief of Yeji for a land option 
of 46,000 hectares for the cultivation of 30,000 
hectares of jatropha. In November 2011, Smart 
Oil signed a leasing contract for 6,750 hectares 
(including 4,500 hectares available for jatropha 
farming) with the Paramount Chief. Smart 
Oil started modestly and set up a six-hectare 
scientific test trial in June 2010, with financial 
support from an Italian Petro company, which in 
return got access to the scientific results (Darko, 
2014). Later, in June 2011, another start-up, 
Futuris S.p.A., incorporated in 2009,43 became 
the main shareholder of Agroils S.r.l. A key reason 
for this investment was to develop the jatropha 
project in Ghana jointly through Smart Oil Ltd.
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4.4 TROUGH OF DISILLUSIONMENT,  2012-2016
4.4.1 LANDSCAPE LEVEL
Oil prices remained stable at around US$ 100 
per barrel until August 2014, when they dropped 
to US$ 40-50 per barrel, continuing into 2016. 
In 2012 the cost of the CERs declined from US$ 
5 to 0.31 per ton, at which point they lost their 
importance completely. The CDM was not 
extended beyond 2012, but was replaced by 
voluntary trading schemes, which have had 
only a very limited impact on biofuel schemes. 
Global biodiesel production increased from 21 
billion litres in 2011 to 30 billion litres in 2015 
(REN21, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013). Biofuel policies 
in Europe and the United States continued to 
be challenged by groups concerned about the 
negative environmental and social impacts of 
biofuels, and policy support increasingly shifted 
towards the promotion of advanced biofuels 
(REN21, 2016).
4.4.2 REGIME LEVEL
At the regime level in this period, the focus 
continued to be on resolving the deepening 
crises in power supply in Ghana. A feed-in tariff 
for renewables was approved in 2013 and revised 
in 2014, and the political focus shifted to small- 
and large-scale solar PV.44 The first large-scale 
grid-connected PV system of 20 MW was installed 
in late 2015 (Adomdza et al., 2016; Kemausuor 
and Ackom, 2016). The draft biofuel policy of 
2010 was merged with a policy on cooking fuels 
into a bioenergy strategy document (Energy 
Commission, 2014), but to date this strategy has 
not been translated into policy.
4.4.3 NICHE LEVEL
By early 2012 the two Norwegian owned 
companies, Scanfarm and Biofuel Africa, had 
converted to food-crop farming and seemed to 
be performing well, while most of the remaining 
jatropha companies were in serious financial 
trouble. By the end of 2014 only Smart Oil and 
Jatropha Africa were still in operation. 
JATROPHA AFRICA
Interviews conducted by Kite in early 2012 
revealed that the company expected to expand 
the existing 300 hectares to 1000 hectares by 
the end of 2012, and to reach 10,000 hectares 
in the next ten years (Kite, 2012). By December 
2014, however, their activities consisted of low-
intensity farming, scattered over different plots in 
four different villages, and the farming area had 
not increased. The jatropha-fuelled generator set 
had been left idle. It  had never been connected to 
the nearby school, which was already connected 
to grid power (Jatropha Africa, 2014). Investors 
were still expected to come on board in a couple 
of months. The declared strategy was to increase 
jatropha production, establish a pressing facility 
and grow vegetables along with jatropha using 
irrigation from the nearby Black Volta River 
(Ampadu, 2014). 
GOLD STAR FARMS 
The manager of Jatropha Africa and the Director 
of Smart Oil agree that Goldstar never cultivated 
any jatropha (Ampadu, 2014; Darko, 2014). There 
were good reasons why Goldstar had already gone 
silent after 2010. In 2016, the owners Jack Holden 
and Lloyd B. Sharp were sentenced to seven and 
five years of imprisonment respectively in Oregon, 
United States, for mail and wire fraud, money-
laundering and conspiracy to commit both 
offences.45 According to newspaper coverage of 
the trial,45 the two men spent most of 2007 and 
2008 collecting US$ 1.2 million from a group of 
small investors from a religious community in the 
city of Portland, where Holden and Sharp posed 
as very devout Christians – Holden as a former 
missionary and pastor. According to newspapers 
reports, the sentenced men were especially 
cunning in that they turned just enough of their 
money into letterheads, offices and factory 
buildings to give the appearance they were hard 
at work.45 They apparently produced test diesel, 
but never in commercial quantities. Holden 
falsely told investors that he had arranged with 
local tribes to grow five million acres of jatropha 
trees in Ghana and that his company, Goldstar 
Farms, would use their investments to buy a 
prefabricated refinery from China that would be 
shipped to Ghana to produce biodiesel.45 
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GALTEN 
Since 2009, very few traces have been left of 
Galten, but as late as 1 August 2012, Galten 
explained to an Israeli business paper that 
‘Yorkville Advisers LLC will invest up to US$ 5 
million in Galten Biodiesel Ltd through a Standby 
Equity Purchase Agreement (SEPA) by Yorkville 
unit YA Global Investments LP’.46 Again it is 
unclear if this investment was a wish or a reality, 
but according to Bloomberg, Galten’s share value 
declined from about US$ 10 million in January 
2012 to zero on 1 January 2013.47 Research 
done by Campion and Acheampong (2014) from 
August to November 2011 includes interviews 
with farmers and company workers at Ididome, 
but they do not reveal details of the area of land 
involved or the functionality of the plantation. 
According to an interview in 2014 with another 
biofuel actor who visited the premises, ‘They only 
planted a few hectares’ (Darko, 2014).
KIMMINIC
After an equity group failed to provide a new 
capital inflow of US$ 3 million in late 2011 (Marfo, 
2014), the company had suspended operations 
by May 2012 (Boamah, 2015). According to 
Marfo, about US$ 16 million had been invested 
at this time. A bush fire, apparently started by a 
group of angry workers influenced by Action Aid 
advocacy, hit part of the plantation in January 
2013 (Boamah, 2014a). By December 2014 guards 
were still posted at the plantation, but weeds 
were taking over the jatropha plants, some of the 
machinery had been stolen or dismantled, and 
the half-finished biofuel processing plant bore 
the clear signs of a failed investment (Kiminic, 
2014). At that time Kimminic was still searching 
for funding, and both Mr Marfo, Head of Kimminic 
Estates, and Mr Frederic Mana Antuma Gyamfi, 
Head of Kimminic Logistics, said that the 
company would revive itself in less than a year’s 
time (Kiminic, 2014; Marfo, 2014). However, 
according to the LinkedIn profile of Mr Anponsem, 
Kimminic was closed by November 2015, and Mr 
Anponsem and his wife are currently continuing 
in Gamps Consulting Services.48 
SMART OIL
An industrial-scale plantation was started by 
Smart Oil in July 2012 in parallel with obtaining 
an environmental permit from the EPA and full 
registration of the land lease in the National 
Register. Smart Oil planted about 450 hectares in 
2012 and finally reached a figure of 720 hectares 
by December 2014.49 Its business strategy was 
one of vertical integration, from the production 
to the export of crude oil for refining and use in 
Europe. According to an interview with Anthony 
Darko, Smart Oil’s strategy had changed 
over time, from selling crude oil for biodiesel 
refining in the EU to using the crude oil in a 
diesel-powered cogeneration plant in Italy and 
selling the electricity at premium prices (green 
certificate system, coefficient of 1.8 for biomass 
from agriculture). In 2014, neither Smart Oil 
nor any other biofuel companies in Ghana had 
established a pressing facility of their own. As 
a result, jatropha was exported as whole seeds 
to Europe, and Smart Oil was buying stocks of 
jatropha from, for example, Kimminic and the 
Ghaya project to sell through the same channels. 
Yet according to Darko, an oil price of US$ 50 
made it unprofitable to produce jatropha oil for 
biofuel. Smart Oil’s strategy therefore shifted to 
selling jatropha oil in non-energy markets where 
prices are higher and volume requirements 
lower, for example, for biochemical uses and the 
treatment of leather (Darko, 2014).
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5.  DRIVERS AND TRAJECTORIES OF FOREIGN 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN JATROPHA IN GHANA
This section draws on the MLP and GVC frameworks to discuss the drivers and trajectories of foreign 
private investment in biofuel production in Ghana as outlined in section four. We first discuss the factors 
identified by MLP scholars as influencing internal niche processes – alignment of expectations, network 
formation, and learning and knowledge sharing – and then go on to discuss important value chain 
attributes, including governance, firm ownership, and access to land and capital.
5.1 ALIGNMENT OF EXPECTATIONS
Compared to the development of other socio-
technical niches, in Ghana the jatropha niche was 
to a large extent driven by expectations rather 
than by tangible results from research or practice. 
From 2000 onwards, the dominant discourse in 
Ghana, as well as globally, depicted jatropha as 
a new wonder crop able to produce vegetable 
oil on marginal land with low inputs of water, 
fertilizer and pesticides. The high expectations 
attached to jatropha continued during the 
following years and in Ghana reached their ‘peak 
of inflated expectations’ period in 2007-2008, 
when all the major jatropha companies were 
established. Despite the appearance of the first 
critical reports on economic and sustainability 
issues in 2007, foreign investors continued 
to be interested in the crop, and the positive 
expectations of jatropha as a profitable business 
continued among some niche and regime actors 
until around 2012. 
The first vision of niche actors was to supply the 
local market at preferential prices in a partnership 
with the government, but during the ‘peak of 
inflated expectations’ period this was quickly 
changed to a vision of large-scale production 
for export markets. This change of vision can be 
explained as a combination of changes at both 
the regime and niche levels and the interactions 
between them. At the niche level, expectations 
of the creation of a local market for biofuels 
were mainly driven by the three Ghanaian local 
niche champions previously mentioned. During 
the ‘technology trigger’ period, these men were 
very active as ‘system builders’ (Ockwell and 
Byrne, 2015) and ensured a strong alignment 
of expectations among niche actors, as well as 
between niche and regime actors, rooted in a 
fear of increasing oil prices, and aiming at import 
substitution. These efforts resulted in several 
project proposals, political statements and draft 
policy papers developed in partnership between 
niche and regime actors.
During the ‘peak of inflated expectations’, 
however, the local market vision changed to 
one of large-scale, vertically integrated export 
production. Several factors contributed to the 
demise of the local market vision: 1) the discovery 
of offshore oil in 2007 and the sharp decline in oil 
prices in 2008, which combined to weaken the 
import substitution argument; 2) a new NDC-
led government in 2009, which was influenced 
by the fierce NGO opposition to biofuels and 
made no effort to support the development of a 
local biofuel market through blending mandates 
(which had been discussed since 2005) or other 
policies; and 3) the reduced influence and 
engagement of the niche champions, including 
the death of the strongest proponent of import 
substitution, Amoah. 
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The large-scale export vision, on the other 
hand, was created in large part by the many 
new foreign-owned companies that established 
export-oriented production in Ghana in these 
years in response to favourable biofuels policies 
in the EU and North America, as outlined later. 
These companies’ links with the political system 
in Ghana were rather weak, and they did not 
seem to invest significant resources in promoting 
a national biofuels market by linking up with 
regime actors. 
In summary, the global discourse of jatropha as 
a wonder crop led to high expectations in Ghana 
regarding jatropha as a profitable business 
opportunity, which after 2008 were fuelled by 
niche actors’ interests and were maintained 
until 2012. The change in visions of the jatropha 
business model from import substitution 
to export orientation exemplifies the ability 
of niche actors to adapt to new conditions, 
which, however, occurred mainly through the 
entry of new (foreign) actors. The ‘slope of 
disillusionment’ period from 2009 to 2012 saw a 
misalignment of expectations between the niche 
level (high expectations and foreign investments) 
and the regime level (low expectations and weak 
national policies), ending in the deep ‘trough of 
disillusion’.
5.2 FORMATION OF NETWORKS 
In the first ‘technology trigger’ period until 
2006, the local niche champions mentioned 
above successfully influenced the regime; 
they belonged to the government stakeholder 
committees set up to elaborate the draft biofuel 
policy issued in 2005, and there were strong 
relationships between a small group of pioneers 
from the private sector, government agencies 
and universities in the first years until 2007-2008 
(Energy Commission, 2014; Marfo, 2014). Even 
in the period of the ‘slope of disillusionment’, 
individual niche actors were also involved in 
government committees on biofuel standards 
and biofuel policy (Janssen and Rutz, 2008).50 Yet 
the new niche actors of foreign-owned companies 
(from Israel, UK, Norway and Canada, often with 
Ghanaian directors) did not form strong or formal 
networks that could have enhanced knowledge-
sharing and policy advocacy. Advocacy and other 
forms of institutional work to change the existing 
regime were instead done on an individual basis 
and did not achieve the level of influence which 
a formalized organisation of jatropha growers 
might have had. Hence, weak network formation 
may have contributed to the demise of the niche.
5.3 LEARNING AND KNOWLEDGE-SHARING 
When foreign-owned companies entered the 
jatropha sector in 2007, donor projects had 
already acquired experience of jatropha growing 
in the region. These included the UNDP projects 
in Mali (from 1996) and the ADRA/UNDP/GEF 
project in Ghana (from 2001), which planted 
2000-2400 hectares of jatropha in an out-growers 
scheme that was closed in 2006 due to low yields 
and a lack of market outlets (Amissah-Arthur 
et al., 2007). However, such experience was not 
analysed and documented by independent 
experts. The tendency not to document or 
communicate negative project results is not 
unusual (Hunsberger, 2010; Nygaard, 2010) and 
is linked to the interest in attracting new funding. 
Similarly, niche champion Amoah claimed to 
have developed an improved, high-yielding 
jatropha seed variety, but failed to document 
its attributes (Amissah-Arthur et al., 2007; KITE, 
2014), and so no wider learning effects were 
achieved. Consequently, the new entrants had 
to rely on their own knowledge. The period of 
‘inflated expectations’ was characterized by high 
levels of uncertainty among these companies 
regarding key aspects such as the business 
model (e.g. large vs. small scale), technologies 
(seed varieties, nutrient and pest management, 
harvesting methods, etc.), natural resources and 
yields. Notwithstanding large knowledge gaps 
about local conditions, they also found it difficult 
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to access general knowledge about large-scale 
jatropha farming, despite visiting projects, 
attending conferences worldwide and studying 
the literature (Darko, 2014; Helvig, 2014). 
Thus, while securing land to help obtain capital and 
starting clearing and planting to show progress, 
the new companies established their own trials. 
Biofuel Africa established a 800 hectares test farm 
in Sugakope in cooperation with the Wosornu 
Foundation, where they experimented with 
different seeds and with mechanized harvesting 
(Helvig, 2014; Kolnes, 2009a), while Smart Oil ran 
a 10 hectare experimental plantation. Kimminic 
appears to have relied on the extensive knowledge 
of niche champion Marfo, who became the 
company’s local director in 2009 and had run his 
own plantation before it burned down in 2007 
(Marfo, 2014). 
In the period from 2003 to 2009, niche and regime 
actors organized and participated in many 
international conferences relating to jatropha. 
These events were important for learning 
from experience abroad, and they provided 
an opportunity for niche actors to establish a 
narrative of their own success, which in turn 
would help raise expectations and access capital. 
The table in Annex 1 summarizes the publicly 
available presentations made by Ghanaian 
niche actors at these conferences, which 
generally paint a very positive picture of jatropha 
experience and expectations in Ghana. This was 
especially the case at the beginning of the period 
– see e.g. (Amoah, 2006a, 2006b) – while later the 
presentations seem more focused on presenting 
the companies’ own stories of having received a 
bad press (Kolnes, 2009a, 2009b). 
The above analysis suggests that the low level 
of learning and knowledge-sharing between 
niche actors in Ghana was a major reason why 
the expectations reached such high level in the 
period of ‘inflated expectations’ and why the 
disillusionment that followed was so severe. 
Weak sector-wide learning seems likewise to 
have constrained the development of jatropha 
export operations by reducing access to locally 
specific technical and managerial information, 
thus increasing the risks, as well as the extra costs 
incurred when each company had to conduct its 
own experiments. 
5.4 VALUE CHAIN GOVERNANCE
During the ‘peak of inflated expectations’, there 
was an important and growing international 
market for refined jatropha biofuel as a result 
of blending mandates, especially in the EU and 
US. In Ghana, while blending mandates and 
biofuel standards were described in draft policy 
documents, it was entirely uncertain if and when 
such policies would be enacted and what the 
domestic price of biofuel would be. It is therefore 
not surprising that nearly all companies adopted 
a business plan based on exports – selling 
jatropha as oil seeds, crude vegetable oil or 
refined biodiesel to overseas buyers. 
The companies followed different strategies 
in this regard. Jatropha Africa planned to sell 
oil seeds to biofuel processing companies. The 
Norwegian companies Scanfarm and Biofuel 
Africa planned to take a further step downstream 
and produce crude oil for further refining by 
oil companies in the EU. Kimminic planned a 
full vertical integration of the value chain, from 
growing the seeds to producing the biodiesel at 
its own on-site refinery and selling it in overseas 
markets. Owning a biodiesel refinery also allowed 
the company to refine vegetable oil produced by 
other companies in Ghana and to supply biofuel 
to the domestic market once blending mandates 
had been introduced. Both Galten and Goldstar 
claimed to be planning vertical integration, but 
they never started a production. The strategy 
of Smart Oil changed over time, from selling 
crude oil for further refinement in the EU to full 
vertical integration whereby the oil seeds were 
exported (sold) to the mother company Futuris in 
Italy, where they were pressed into crude oil and 
combusted in a co-generation electricity plant 
operated by Futuris. 
26 U N E P  D T U  P a r t n e r s h i p   |   Wo r k i n g  P a p e r  S e r i e s  2 0 1 7 : 1
By controlling larger segments of the value chain 
through downstream vertical integration, the 
companies could in principle reduce market 
risks by supplying a product (refined biodiesel) 
for which a global commodity market existed, 
as opposed to supplying intermediate products 
for more fragmented markets. However, such 
a strategy is also very demanding in terms of 
capital requirements (especially for advanced 
processing) and regarding the expertise needed 
to perform each chain function effectively and 
efficiently –- cultivation, pressing to crude 
oil, refining to biodiesel, transportation, and 
marketing – and to coordinate the functions 
internally within the company. The fact that 
jatropha was a new technology obviously 
increased the costs and risks involved in such a 
strategy.
Kimminic was successful in establishing a 
functioning large-scale plantation of 5000 
hectares and might have survived with a business 
model of oil seed exports, but it could not to 
attract enough funds to complete the pressing 
and refinery facility. Biofuel Africa aimed to sell 
crude oil and found that their potential buyers 
demanded very large quantities, which required 
large investments in and a rapid expansion of 
primary production capacity. The company 
successfully established the first part of a large-
scale plantation (400 ha) and developed close 
buyer contacts with Statoil (Norway) and Neste 
Oil (Finland) to ensure a market for the crude oil 
and to raise capital. However, Biofuel Africa went 
bankrupt in early 2009 when Statoil lost interest 
following the financial crisis and had to stop its 
farming operation (Helvig, 2014). Jatropha Africa 
aimed to sell only raw oil seeds and also went 
bankrupt in 2009. Smart Oil grew slowly with 
limited funds and changed its strategy along the 
way from transport fuels to renewable electricity 
generation. It proved the most resilient of the 
companies studied. 
While the company cases reviewed here are too 
limited to assess which value chain strategy 
is the ‘best’ when it comes to promoting the 
development of a jatropha niche, they do point 
to the existence of significant entry barriers to 
establishing new agriculture-based value chains 
for global biofuel markets, especially in terms of 
volume, investment capital and market risks.
5.5 FIRM OWNERSHIP AND CAPITAL LINKAGES
The seven companies investigated in this study 
were established as subsidiaries of start-up 
companies based in Europe, North America and 
Israel. Access to capital for the start-ups was very 
limited compared to the companies’ own visions 
of their potential size and growth, and raising 
capital was a time-consuming activity during 
their short lives. Several investors were typically 
involved in supplying venture capital, and in the 
case of three companies, Ghanaian residents 
residing abroad were among the investors. We 
could not trace the exact origin of the invested 
capital, but there were links to the oil industry: 
The two Norwegian companies were registered 
in Stavanger, a town known for its off-shore 
industry, while one of the investors in the Italian-
owned company (Smart Oil) was an Italian petro-
company. 
In terms of investor or owner competence, it is 
noteworthy that only in the case of Smart Oil did 
a foreign investor (Agroils) seem to have technical 
competence in agriculture or bioenergy, while 
only one Ghanaian co-owner (of Jatropha Africa) 
seem to have such competence. In the other 
cases, the dominant competence was in the 
area of business administration and business 
development, acquired through higher education 
and/or work experience in sectors other 
than agriculture or energy, such as telecoms, 
pharmaceuticals or business consultancy. 
Overall, the fact that the companies were start-
ups with limited equity and that the owners 
generally lacked competence in agriculture or 
the oil industry contributed significantly to the 
vulnerability of the companies. 
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5.6 ACCESS TO LAND AND CAPITAL LINKAGES
The dominant form of land acquisition for large-
scale jatropha production was the leasing of 
land from traditional chiefs or councils, often 
for a period of fifty years. Among the five firms 
for which information is available, four (Biofuel 
Africa, Kimminic, Smart Oil and Scanfarm) 
obtained official registration of the lease, while 
in one case (Jatropha Africa) the arrangements 
concerning remained informal. In one case 
(Kimminic), the lease involved joint ownership 
and profit-sharing of part of the operation with 
local communities. An outgrower scheme was 
also planned in this case. The size of the jatropha 
operations in terms of the area planted with 
jatropha at any given time (typically around 
2008-09) varied between 350 and 1400 ha, while 
in 2011 Kimminic cultivated about 5000 hectares. 
These acreages were much smaller than the 
companies had planned; the land for jatropha 
leased by four companies for which we have 
reliable data was 4,500 hectares (Smart Oil), 
13,000 hectares (Scanfarm), 23,764 hectares 
(Biofuel Africa), and 65,000 hectares (Kimminic) 
respectively. Altogether, these companies only 
planted around 3 percent (7,800 ha) of this land 
resource with jatropha (see Table 1).
Together with the high expectations regarding 
the profitability of jatropha production, access 
to land was a critical asset used by the start-
ups to raise investment capital. This was clearly 
expressed in our interviews with companies, and 
in the case of Galten its homepage stated that 
the business model was ‘to get hold of large land 
areas for the plantation of jatropha’.51 Secondly, 
demonstrating control over large land resources 
was a key to convincing potential overseas buyers 
that the operation would eventually supply the oil 
in the large quantities these buyers demanded. 
Thirdly, planting large areas was necessary 
to achieve the benefits of the economies of 
scale involved in the production, processing, 
transporting and selling of jatropha. Hence, 
access to land was a key means to overcome 
entry barriers in terms of access to capital, 
production volumes and economies of scale. 
The start-ups were thus not only incentivized to 
secure access to large tracts of land at an early 
stage, but also – in some cases – to exaggerate 
the size of this resource, as well as the degree 
of control they exercised over it (see Table 1). As 
documented elsewhere (Boamah, 2014a), such 
land claims attracted widespread criticism from 
NGOs especially and most likely contributed to 
reducing investor confidence in jatropha. 
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6.  CONCLUSION
This report has applied the MLP and GVC 
frameworks in order to analyse the drivers and 
trajectories of foreign private investment in 
biofuel production in Ghana. We have presented 
an example of a non-evolutionary niche 
development, which goes beyond European 
experience of industrial niche development on 
which the MLP framework was first established. 
We argue that analysis of key value-chain 
attributes such as governance, ownership and 
access to capital is important for understanding 
biofuel niche development in developing 
countries, suggesting that a marriage between 
the MLP and GVC perspectives would be fruitful.
The configuration and governance of the emerging 
jatropha value chain involved important entry 
barriers, which contributed to the collapse of 
the emerging jatropha sector in Ghana and 
thus to the failure to capitalize on the initial 
high expectations regarding jatropha biofuel 
production. These barriers included high volume 
requirements, high capital needs, and market 
risks related to unpredictable events - notably oil 
price fluctuations and the financial crisis. While 
such conditions may be common for the energy 
sector, they were clearly a show stopper for the 
development of a new agriculture-based value 
chain in Ghana. An important contextual factor 
here was the absence of a domestic demand for 
biodiesel related to weak policy support despite 
the efforts of local niche actors to promote the 
biofuels agenda in Ghana. In the MLP language, 
as politico-economic conditions beyond the 
influence of these actors changed during the late 
2000s, expectations became misaligned - both 
within the niche and between the niche and the 
regime. Misalignment was also present in a low 
level of learning and knowledge-sharing between 
jatropha actors, which, alongside weak public 
R&D support, reduced access to technical and 
managerial information for the export operators.
In line with the findings of previous research on 
biofuel value chains (Ponte, 2014), policy and 
NGOs had a stronger influence on the governance 
and dynamics of the jatropha value chain than 
what is typical for agricultural value chains. The 
study furthermore highlights the role of foreign 
investors in biofuels value chains. Relatedly, 
our analysis shows that global drivers, i.e. 
trends in international fuel and capital markets, 
as well as the strategies and capabilities of 
foreign investors, can strongly influence the 
development of a new biofuel value chain in a 
developing country. The importance of investors 
and policy environment at different levels of the 
value chain illustrate the synergies in combining 
the MLP and GVC frameworks, which should be 
further explored in future research on energy 
transitions in developing countries.
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ANNEX 1. GHANAIAN INDUSTRY ACTORS AS SPEAKERS AT 
INTERNATIONAL JATROPHA CONFERENCES (authors’ compilation 
based on Web resources accessed 11. December 2016) 
Conference Date and place Participant speakers Source
Ghana Holds First Biodiesel 
Investors’ Forum, held by the 
Energy Commission of Ghana 
in collaboration with Ghana Bio 
Energy Limited 
29. April 2004
Onua Amoah, Ghana Bio 
Energy Limited
http://evworld.com/news.
cfm?newsid=5582 
Financing biofuels and jatropha 
plantation projects with special 
emphasis on Clean Development 
Mechanisms (CDM), UNCTAD
13 –14 
November 2006, 
Accra, Ghana
Onua Amoah, CEO, 
Anuanom Industrial Bio 
Products Ltd., Ghana
(Amoah, 2006a)(Amoah, 2006b) 
(UNCTAD, 2006).
Jatropha World Conference 
5. October 
2008, Hamburg, 
Germany
Giovanni Venturini Del 
Greco, General manager, 
Agroils S.r.l
http://www.cmtevents.
com/speakerprofiles.
aspx?ev=081031&spid=397319& 
COMPETE International Workshop 
‘Bioenergy Policies for Sustainable 
Development in Africa’
25-27 
November 2008, 
Bamako, Mali
Ohene Akoto, Jatropha 
Africa
(Janssen and Rutz, 2008)
COMPETE International Conference 
‘Bioenergy Implementation in 
Africa’
26-28 May 2009, 
Lusaka, Zambia
Wisdom Ahiataku-Togobo, 
Ministry of Energy
(Ahiataku-Togobo and Ofosu-
Ahenkorah, 2009)
World Jatropha Summit ‘Towards 
Higher Yields, Large-Scale 
Production and Exports for the 
International Market’
28-29 May, 
2009, Accra, 
Ghana
Speakers unknown, 
Interview with Ohene 
Akoto, Jack Holden
https://emeliaennin.wordpress.
com/2009/05/31/biofuel-threat-to-
food-security/ 
Second Jatropha World Africa 
conference 
14-15 October 
2009, Brussels, 
Belgium
Steiner Kolnes, Biofuel 
Africa
http://www.cmtevents.
com/speakerprofiles.
aspx?EV=091021&spid=369237& 
Bioenergy Markets West Africa 
conference
27 October 
2009, Accra, 
Ghana 
Abeku Brew-Hammond, 
Energy Commission
Kofi Marfo, Biofuel1
Ohene Akoto, Jatropha 
Africa
(Brew-Hammond, 2009)(PANGEA, 
2009)
Regional dialogue with key 
stakeholders on commercial 
pressures on West African land, 
led by SWAC/OECD as part of the 
Annual Meeting of the Food Crisis 
Prevention Network co-organised 
by CILSS, 8-10 December 2009
9. December 
2009, Bamako, 
Mali
Steiner Kolnes, Biofuel 
Africa
(Kolnes, 2009a)
Production of non-food, bio-oil 
supply chains for renewable energy 
in Ghana: needs, Challenges and 
Opportunities, Training Workshop. 
http://www.acpnonfood.com/
Workshop3.html
7-9 October 
2010
Clive Coker, Jatropha 
Africa
Ohene Akoto, Jatropha 
Africa
Wisdom Ahiataku-Togobo, 
Ministry of Energy
http://www.acpnonfood.com/WS3.4-
20101007-(Clive%20Coker).pdf 
http://www.acpnonfood.com/WS3.6-
20101007-(Ohene%20Okato).pdf 
Renewable energy policy (emphasis 
on biofuel sources); Legislative 
framework; Government support. 
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